Page 12 - Seniors Today - Vol1 Issue 3

of communication from Srinagar to Sonamarg necessary with winter approaching. The Manali
and onwards to Dras via Zoji-La. In June several
attacks by the enemy forces were repulsed but
they gained ground by reaching the top of the
hills around and thereby gaining commanding
positions overlooking the complete pass. They
soon started beefing up their positions with
heavy artillery and also to outflank the Indian
positions. Sheer numbers were against Indians
but they held positions very bravely and against
all odds.
Between June and July major attacks from
the enemy established the fact that with such
intensity and use of heavy artillery, it was
indeed the enemy regulars who were fighting
and not “raiders”. Gen Thimaya who was in
charge of the entire Valley approved of the
organised withdrawal of the forces from Machoi
and Gumri to Zoji-La. While it was a tactical
move, it meant giving up some very strategic
locations in the surrounding hilltops. In the
meanwhile traffic on the Srinagar to Sonamarg
was restored in July. Plans were afoot to regain
control of Dras and Kargil as well as Skardu.
Gumri Nov 2, 1948
An aborted attempt to find a second route
via the Muskoh valley forced the top Indian
army brass to have a rethink and make new
plans to go through Zoji-La, Gumri and Dras
to Kargil. Yet another attempt to go for a three-
pronged attack too did not yield results, and
with heavy losses the Indians had to retreat.
The consequence of the Indian forces not
making much headway was actually felt on
the Ladakh area, as with a (now) large force,
stocking up of rations and ammunition was
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route was decidedly more difficult and prone
to closure due to early snow. In September ’48
at a high level meeting under Gen Cariappa it
was decided to use heavy tank artillery to push
through. That was easier said than done, as
the small bridges en route from Jammu area to
Sonamarg were a big problem for such heavy
equipment. Not only that, there was practically
no road beyond Baltal (at the base of Zoji-La) – it
was at best a jeepable road and getting heavy
tanks to go up the steep tracks would be nearly
impossible without being undetected. On two
to three occasions I had observed Gen Thimaya
toying with this idea and wondering aloud as
to how it could be done. I recall that sometime
in the end of September Sheikh Abdullah had
visited Gurez along with Gen Thimaya and
while driving back (I was in the same vehicle) it
was disclosed that the proposal to use tanks at
Zoji-La was being favourably considered by the
military HD in Delhi.
In this background, certain important
incidents take on their own significance. First
and foremost was how to get the tanks from
the plains into the mountains and up to Zoji-
La, without disclosing the surprise part of it.
Second was how to get the tanks up from Baltal
(at the foot of Zoji-La) to the top of the pass
(because there was no road beyond Baltal) and
the mountainside was unstable and steep. Third
was the condition of the ground on both sides
of the pass, which had never been tested for
heavy weights and no one knew whether the
tanks would be able to move on or get bogged
down. Having got the tanks dismantled in the
Jammu plains, they were transported only
during the nights to Baltal and reassembled
at the other end. The surprise was kept. Gen.
Thimaya devised that an armoured carrier was
given heavy plating to bring it to the level of the
weight of the Stuart tank which was to be put
as the vanguard vehicle so if it sinks into the
marshy ground, real tanks would not be lost.
It was in the last week of September that
orders were given to 7th Cavalry to move from
Akhnoor to Srinagar. Speed and secrecy was
of paramount importance. The next challenge